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THE evidence is unmistakable that public opinion throughout
the country looks upon the infliction of the death penalty with
growing disfavor. This may be seen from legislation both
federal and state. Early in 1897 an act of Congress was passed
to reduce the number of cases in the Federal courts in which the
death penalty may be inflicted. It provides that in all cases
where the accused is found guilty of murder under the Revised
Statutes of the United States the jury so finding may qualify
their verdict by incorporating in it the words, "without capital
punishment." The effect of these words is to reduce the
sentence from death to imprisonment at hard labor for life. By
virtue of the above act Thomas Brain, who has been again con-
victed of the murder of the captain of the barkentine Herbert
Fuller, and his wife, will escape with his life.
A striking example of the tendency above noted is found in
the action of the Ohio legislature, recently, in the passage of
an act which provides that in capital cases the jury may recom-
mend mercy in their verdict, whereupon the judge shall sentence
the prisoner to imprisonment for life.
It will be seen that the effect of the above statutes and
,others of similar tenor is to leave the question of life or death
wholly to the jury. That body not only finds the facts but
virtually passes sentence in accordance therewith. The matter
is removed entirely from the discretion of the court. It cannot
be said that the discretion of the court is lessened-judges never
have had any in this matter-but certainly the discretion of the
jury is vastly increased.
EDITORIALS.
Such legislation is fairly indicative of the growing prejudice
in all sections to the infliction of the extreme penalty. The
feeling that the state has no right to take a human life as a
forfeit for crime seems to be gaining ground. At least the
popular impression is that, granted so great a right to the state,
it should be most sparingly exercised. Recent legislation has
reflected this sentiment and the tendency seems to be to confine
the right within narrow limits, making death the penalty only
under circumstances which justify so harsh and rigorous a pun-
ishment.
The wisdom of the policy is an open question for the future
to decide. It is midway between the extremes of the total abo-
lition of the death penalty and its unrestricted infliction in
capital cases, and may therefore appeal to advocates of both.
It seems to combine many of their advantages.
A RECENT decision of the highest court in the land is important
in that it will do much toward settling a mooted question. The
Supreme Court of the United States has declared the Illinois Inher-
itance Tax Act, constitutional and valid, thus placing itself in line
with what appears to be the current of modern adjudication. The
court finds the Illinois act not peculiar to itself, and determines its
validity upon the general principles applicable to such statutes.
The court holds that an inheritance tax is not one on property,
but on the succession to property, that the right to inherit prop-
erty is a creature of law, not a natural right, and therefore that the
state, the authority granting the right, may limit it with conditions,
as it sees fit.
BEQUESTS FOR THE SAYING OF MASSES.
THE courts of some of our States have been slow to get away
from the rule of the English cases in which, under the amalga-
mated condition of church and state bequests and devises for
the saying of masses have been held void, as superstitious uses
or creating perpetuities. But of four recent cases three
decisions sustain, and only one denies, the validity of bequests
for masses. The affirmative cases are Moran v. Moran, 73 N.
W. 617; Hoeffer v. Clogan, 49 N. E. 527, and Harrison v.
Brophy, 5i Pac. 883. These decisions are directly opposed to
the English cases, although they are in harmony with the
majority of the American decisions. In Festoraggi v. St.
Joseph's Catholic Church, 25 L. R. A. 36o, it is said: "Under
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our political institutions, which maintained and enforced abso-
lute separation of church and state, and the utmost freedom of
religious thought and action there is no place for the English
doctrine of superstitious uses." And the note to that case
makes it very plain that no such rule or principle now obtains
here. But opposed to-the above decisions are those of the courts
of New York, Alabama and Wisconsin. The grounds of these
decisions vary. In New York charitable uses were abolished by
legislation and in all valid trusts there must be a definite and
certain beneficiary to take the equitable title. The Alabama
court held that a bequest to be used in solemn mass for the re-
pose of the testator's soul could not be supported as a charitable
bequest. And the recent decision in McHugh v. McCole, 72 N.
W. 631, was upon the ground that a trust to be sustained must
be of a clear and definite nature and the beneficiary "interest to
every person therein must be fully expressed and clearly defined
upon the face of the instrument.
So the decisions on this subject are not yet in accord. But
the tendency of the American courts is all in the direction of
sustaining the validity of these bequests. In the Wisconsin case
the judge expressed regret that the intention of the testator
could not be given effect because he had put it in the form of a
trust provision. And in the Iowa case the court said: "It is
not wise in such cases for courts to quibble about the technical
trusts or beneficiaries. Results are of greater importance than
technical names, and a bequest for a known lawful .purpose,
where the power of execution is prescribed and available, should
never fail for want of a name or a lekal classification, unless it
is in obedience to a positive rule of law."
